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The paper approaches the low-level details of the code generated by compilers whose format 
permits outside actions. Binary code modifications are manually done when the internal 
format is known and understood, or automatically by certain tools developed to process the 
binary code. The binary code instrumentation goals may be various from security increasing 
and bug fixing to development of malicious software. The paper highlights the binary code 
instrumentation techniques by code injection to increase the security and reliability of a 
software application. Also, the paper offers examples for binary code formats understanding 
and how the binary code injection may be applied. 
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Binary Code Formats 
The  binary  code  is  the  output  of  the 
compiling process. It uses two binary digits, 
0  and  1,  to  represent  symbols  or  computer 
processor instructions as bit strings.  
The binary code is directly executed by the 
computer  processor  or  is  interpreted  by  a 
specialized  software  component  which 
translates  the  binary  code  into  the  format 
understood  by  the  computer  processor. 
Therefore, the binary code is classified into 
two groups: 
  Native code  –  is  generated  by  the 
compiler  depending  on  the  hardware 
features;  the  binary  files  containing 
native  code  are  executed  only  by 
computer processor units (CPU) having 
the  same  features  like  the  computer 
processor  used  to  generate  it;  some 
significant  advantages  are  execution 
speed  and  absence  of  other  software 
components; 
  Intermediate code – is generated by the 
compiler  according  to  intermediate 
language specifications to be interpreted 
by a virtual machine; some examples of 
virtual  machines  are  Java  Virtual 
Machine  (JVM)  for  Java  platform  and 
Common Language Runtime (CLR) for 
.NET framework; a big advantage is the 
binary  code  portability  for  different 
hardware and software platforms. 
Some  considerations  related  to  binary  code 
and file formats are presented in [1], [2], [4], 
[5], [6], [8] and [9]. 
The memory layout of native code file for a 
C program is depicted in figure 1 [11]. 
The  user  space  is  structured  into  the 
following segments: 
  Code segment –  c o n t a i n s  e x e c u t a b l e  
instructions in binary format; it is a read-
only  segment  and  is  shared  among 
concurrent users; 
  Data segment  –  contains  static  and 
global  data  initialized  in  the  program 
code;  each  process  has  its  own  data 
segment;  the  data  segment  is  not  a 
executable one; 
  Block Started by Symbol (BSS) segment 
–  contains  static  and  global  data 
uninitialized  in  the  program  code;  it  is 
not an executable segment; 
  Stack segment  –  is  used  to  store  local 
variables (declared inside the functions) 
and to pass parameters to functions; the 
stack addresses are allocated from higher 
memory to lower memory; it is managed 
by  Stack  Pointer  (SP)/Extended  Stack 
Pointer  (ESP)/  Register  Stack  Pointer 
(RSP) register; 
  Heap segment –  i s  u s e d  t o  a l l o c a t e  
memory at running time; heap allocation 
is  managed  by  operating  system;  the 
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heap addresses are managed by pointer  variables. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Memory address space of a process 
 
Segment  registers  are  memory  pointers 
placed  inside  the  computer  processor  unit. 
They point to memory address where a data 
storage or code execution starts. The segment 
registers for x86 architecture are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The segment registers for x86 computer architecture 
Name  Content 
CS – Code Segment  Pointer to the code location 
SS – Stack Segment  Pointer to the stack location 
DS – Data Segment  Pointer to the data location 
ES – Extra Segment  Pointer to extra data 
FS – F Segment  Pointer to extra data 
GS – G Segment  Pointer to extra data 
 
It considers the following C++ program source: 
class Employee{
public:  
    char* Name; 
    int id; 
 
    Employee(char* aName, int nr){ 
        this->Name = aName; 
        this->id = nr; 
        procData(aName, nr); 
    } 
    char* empName(){ return this->Name; } 
    int empID(){ return this->id; } 
    void procData(char* sName, int snr){ } 
}; 
 
void main() {  
 Employee  e("Smith", 113); 
 e.empID(); 
 e.empName(); 
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The  native  code  built  by  Microsoft  Visual 
Studio 2010, x64 version, for each method is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Native code for Employee class   
Method header  Memory 
address 
Binary assembly 
instruction 
Assembly instruction 
Employee(char*,int);  00FF1440 
00FF1441 
00FF1443 
00FF1449 
00FF144A 
00FF144B 
00FF144C 
00FF144D 
00FF1453 
00FF1458 
00FF145D 
00FF145F 
00FF1460 
00FF1463 
00FF1466 
00FF1469 
00FF146B 
00FF146E 
00FF1471 
00FF1474 
00FF1477 
00FF1478 
00FF147B 
00FF147C 
00FF147F 
 
00FF1484 
00FF1487 
00FF1488 
00FF1489 
00FF148A 
00FF1490 
00FF1492 
 
00FF1497 
00FF1499 
00FF149A 
55 
8B EC 
81 EC CC 00 00 00 
53 
56 
57 
51 
8D BD 34 FF FF FF 
B9 33 00 00 00 
B8 CC CC CC CC 
F3 AB 
59 
89 4D F8 
8B 45 F8 
8B 4D 08 
89 08 
8B 45 F8 
8B 4D 0C 
89 48 04 
8B 45 0C 
50 
8B 4D 08 
51 
8B 4D F8 
E8 11 FD FF FF 
 
8B 45 F8 
5F 
5E 
5B 
81 C4 CC 00 00 00 
3B EC 
E8 9F FC FF FF 
 
8B E5 
5D 
C2 08 00 
push ebp   
mov ebp,esp   
sub esp,0CCh   
push ebx   
push esi   
push edi   
push ecx   
lea edi,[ebp-0CCh]   
mov ecx,33h   
mov eax,0CCCCCCCCh   
rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]   
pop ecx   
mov dword ptr [ebp-8],ecx       
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
mov ecx,dword ptr [aName]   
mov dword ptr [eax],ecx   
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
mov ecx,dword ptr [nr]   
mov dword ptr [eax+4],ecx     
mov eax,dword ptr [nr]   
push eax   
mov ecx,dword ptr [aName]   
push ecx   
mov ecx,dword ptr [this]   
call Employee::procData 
(0FF1195h)   
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
pop edi   
pop esi   
pop ebx   
add esp,0CCh   
cmp ebp,esp   
call @ILT+305(__RTC_CheckEsp) 
(0FF1136h)   
mov esp,ebp   
pop ebp   
ret 8   
char* empName();  00FF14C0 
00FF14C1 
00FF14C3 
00FF14C9 
00FF14CA 
00FF14CB 
00FF14CC 
00FF14CD 
00FF14D3 
00FF14D8 
00FF14DD 
00FF14DF 
00FF14E0 
00FF14E3 
00FF14E6 
00FF14E8 
00FF14E9 
00FF14EA 
00FF14EB 
00FF14ED 
00FF14EE 
55 
8B EC 
81 EC CC 00 00 00 
53 
56 
57 
51 
8D BD 34 FF FF FF 
B9 33 00 00 00 
B8 CC CC CC CC 
F3 AB 
59 
89 4D F8 
8B 45 F8 
8B 00 
5F 
5E 
5B 
8B E5 
5D 
C3 
push ebp   
mov ebp,esp   
sub esp,0CCh   
push ebx   
push esi   
push edi   
push ecx   
lea edi,[ebp-0CCh]   
mov ecx,33h   
mov eax,0CCCCCCCCh   
rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]   
pop ecx   
mov dword ptr [ebp-8],ecx       
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
mov eax,dword ptr [eax]   
pop edi   
pop esi   
pop ebx   
mov esp,ebp   
pop ebp   
ret   
int empID();  00FF1500 
00FF1501 
55 
8B EC 
push ebp   
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00FF1503 
00FF1509 
00FF150A 
00FF150B 
00FF150C 
00FF150D 
00FF1513 
00FF1518 
00FF151D 
00FF151F 
00FF1520 
00FF1523 
00FF1526 
00FF1529 
00FF152A 
00FF152B 
00FF152C 
00FF152E 
00FF152F 
81 EC CC 00 00 00 
53 
56 
57 
51 
8D BD 34 FF FF FF 
B9 33 00 00 00 
B8 CC CC CC CC 
F3 AB 
59 
89 4D F8 
8B 45 F8 
8B 40 04 
5F 
5E 
5B 
8B E5 
5D 
C3 
sub esp,0CCh   
push ebx   
push esi   
push edi   
push ecx   
lea edi,[ebp-0CCh]   
mov ecx,33h   
mov eax,0CCCCCCCCh   
rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]   
pop ecx   
mov dword ptr [ebp-8],ecx       
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
mov eax,dword ptr [eax+4]   
pop edi   
pop esi   
pop ebx   
mov esp,ebp   
pop ebp   
ret   
void procData 
(char*,int); 
00FF1540 
00FF1541 
00FF1543 
00FF1549 
00FF154A 
00FF154B 
00FF154C 
00FF154D 
00FF1553 
00FF1558 
00FF155D 
00FF155F 
00FF1560 
00FF1563 
00FF1564 
00FF1565 
00FF1566 
00FF1568 
00FF1569 
55 
8B EC 
81 EC CC 00 00 00 
53 
56 
57 
51 
8D BD 34 FF FF FF 
B9 33 00 00 00 
B8 CC CC CC CC 
F3 AB 
59 
89 4D F8 
5F 
5E 
5B 
8B E5 
5D 
C2 08 00 
push ebp   
mov ebp,esp   
sub esp,0CCh   
push ebx   
push esi   
push edi   
push ecx   
lea edi,[ebp-0CCh]   
mov ecx,33h   
mov eax,0CCCCCCCCh   
rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]   
pop ecx   
mov dword ptr [ebp-8],ecx   
pop edi   
pop esi   
pop ebx   
mov esp,ebp   
pop ebp   
ret 8   
 
The main function has the following native code content: 
 
Table 3. Native code for main function 
Function 
header 
Memory 
address 
Binary assembly 
instruction 
Assembly instruction 
void main();  00FF13A0   
00FF13A1   
00FF13A3   
00FF13A9   
00FF13AA   
00FF13AB   
00FF13AC   
00FF13B2   
00FF13B7   
00FF13BC   
00FF13BE   
00FF13C0   
00FF13C5   
00FF13C8   
00FF13CD   
00FF13D0   
00FF13D5   
00FF13D8   
00FF13DD   
00FF13DF   
00FF13E0   
00FF13E2   
55 
8B EC 
81 EC D0 00 00 00 
53 
56 
57 
8D BD 30 FF FF FF 
B9 34 00 00 00 
B8 CC CC CC CC 
F3 AB 
6A 71 
68 3C 57 FF 00 
8D 4D F4 
E8 14 FD FF FF 
8D 4D F4 
E8 35 FC FF FF 
8D 4D F4 
E8 77 FD FF FF 
33 C0 
52 
8B CD 
50 
push ebp 
mov ebp,esp 
sub esp,0D0h 
push ebx 
push esi 
push edi 
lea edi,[ebp-0D0h] 
mov ecx,34h 
mov eax,0CCCCCCCCh 
rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]  
push 71h  
push offset string "Smith" (0FF573Ch) 
lea ecx,[e] 
call Employee::Employee (0FF10E1h) 
lea ecx,[e]  
call Employee::empID (0FF100Ah) 
lea ecx,[e]  
call Employee:: empName (0FF1154h) 
xor eax,eax  
push edx  
mov ecx,ebp 
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00FF13E3   
00FF13E9   
 
00FF13EE   
00FF13EF   
00FF13F0   
00FF13F1   
00FF13F2   
00FF13F3   
00FF13F9   
00FF13FB   
 
00FF1400   
00FF1402   
00FF1403   
8D 15 04 14 FF 00 
E8 94 FC FF FF 
 
58 
5A 
5F 
5E 
5B 
81 C4 D0 00 00 00 
3B EC 
E8 36 FD FF FF 
 
8B E5 
5D 
C3 
lea edx, [(0FF1404h)] 
call @ILT+125(@_RTC_CheckStackVars@8) 
(0FF1082h) 
pop eax  
pop edx 
pop edi 
pop esi 
pop ebx 
add esp,0D0h  
cmp ebp,esp  
call @ILT+305(__RTC_CheckEsp) 
(0FF1136h) 
mov esp,ebp  
pop ebp 
ret    
 
Tables 2 and 3 contain numerical values for 
memory addresses and binary code in base-
16  format.  The  assembly  instructions  and 
their  binary  codes  are  generated  for  x86 
computer architecture. 
The  intermediate  code  provides  the 
portability feature to a software application.  
A  virtual  machine  interprets  the  operation 
codes from intermediate code and translates 
them into native code for the machine which 
runs the virtual machine. The operation codes 
are  associated  to  intermediate  instructions 
like  the  native  code  with  the  assembly 
instructions.  The  intermediate  instructions 
are  used  within  an  intermediate  language 
representing the lowest-level human-readable 
programming language.  
For  .NET  Framework,  the  intermediate 
language  is  called  Common  Intermediate 
Language  (CIL)  and  it  is  defined  by 
Common Language Infrastructure (CLI). The 
CIL  is  object-oriented  and  stack-based. 
Unlike the CPU architecture, the stack-based 
architecture  pushes  data  on  a  stack  instead 
pulling data from registers. 
The  Employee  class  and  main f u n c t i o n  
defined  above  have  the  following  content 
written  in  C#  programming  language:
 
class Employee
{ 
    public String Name; 
    public int id; 
 
    public Employee(String aName, int nr){ 
        this.Name = aName; 
        this.id = nr; 
        procData(aName, nr); 
    } 
 
    public String empName(){ return this.Name; } 
    public int empID(){ return this.id; } 
    public void procData(String sName, int snr) { } 
 
    public static void Main() {  
        Employee e = new Employee("Smith", 113); 
        e.empID(); 
        e.empName(); 
    } 
} 
 
The  intermediate  code  built  by  Microsoft 
Visual  Studio  2010,  x64  version,  for  each 
method  is  presented  in  Table  4.
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Table 4. C# .NET Intermediate code for Employee class 
Method header  IL 
offset 
Binary 
intermediate 
instruction 
Intermediate instruction 
Employee(String,
int); 
IL_0000 
IL_0001 
 
IL_0006 
IL_0007 
IL_0008 
IL_0009 
IL_000a 
 
IL_000f 
IL_0010 
IL_0011 
IL_0016 
IL_0017 
IL_0018 
IL_0019 
 
IL_001e 
IL_001f 
IL_0020 
02 
28 0A 00 00 11 
 
00  
00 
02 
03 
7D 04 00 00 01 
 
02 
04 
7D 04 00 00 02 
02 
03 
04 
28 06 00 00 04 
 
00 
00 
2A 
ldarg.0 
call instance void [mscorlib]System. 
Object::.ctor()  
nop 
nop 
ldarg.0 
ldarg.1 
stfld string EmployeeApp.Employee 
::Name 
ldarg.0 
ldarg.2 
stfld int32 EmployeeApp.Employee::id 
ldarg.0 
ldarg.1 
ldarg.2 
call instance void EmployeeApp. 
Employee::procData(string, int32) 
nop 
nop 
ret 
String 
empName(); 
IL_0000 
IL_0001 
IL_0002 
 
IL_0007 
IL_0008 
IL_000a 
IL_000b 
00 
02 
7B 04 00 00 01 
 
0A 
2B 00 
06 
2A 
nop 
ldarg.0 
ldfld string EmployeeApp.Employee
::Name 
stloc.0 
br.s IL_000a 
ldloc.0 
ret 
int empID();  IL_0000 
IL_0001 
IL_0002 
IL_0007 
IL_0008 
IL_000a 
IL_000b 
00 
02 
7B 04 00 00 02 
0A 
2B 00 
06 
2A 
nop 
ldarg.0 
ldfld int32 EmployeeApp.Employee::id 
stloc.0 
br.s IL_000a 
ldloc.0 
ret 
void procData 
(String,int); 
IL_0000 
IL_0001 
00 
2A 
nop 
ret 
static void 
Main(); 
IL_0000 
IL_0001 
IL_0006 
IL_0008 
 
IL_000d 
IL_000e 
IL_000f 
 
IL_0014 
IL_0015 
IL_0016 
 
IL_001b 
IL_001c 
00 
72 70 00 00 01 
1F 71 
73 06 00 00 01 
 
0A 
06 
6F 06 00 00 03 
 
26 
06 
6F 06 00 00 02 
 
26 
2A 
nop 
ldstr "Smith" 
ldc.i4.s 113 
newobj instance void EmployeeApp. 
Employee::.ctor(string, int32) 
stloc.0 
ldloc.0 
callvirt instance int32 EmployeeApp. 
Employee::empID() 
pop 
ldloc.0 
callvirt instance string EmployeeApp. 
Employee::empName() 
pop 
ret 
 
The  intermediate  language  (IL)  offset 
represents  the  position  of  the  current 
intermediate  instruction  relative  to  the 
beginning  section  where  the  method 
intermediate  code  is  stored  in  the  file 
translated  by  .NET  virtual  machine  into 
native  code.  The  intermediate  code  is 
organized  in  accordance  with  Portable 
Executable  (PE)  specifications  for  .NET 
applications. 
The  Java  bytecode  is  the  output  of  a  Java 
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intermediate code. The bytecode files have a 
specific  organization  to  be  interpreted  by 
JVM. 
In  Java  programming  language,  the  above 
example has the following content: 
 
class Employee extends java.lang.Object {
public String Name; 
public int id; 
 
public Employee(String aName,int nr){ 
  this.Name = aName; 
  this.id = nr; 
 procData(aName,  nr); 
} 
public String empName(){ return this.Name; } 
public int empID(){ return this.id; } 
public void procData(String sName,int snr) { } 
 
public static void main(String[] args) {  
        Employee e = new Employee("Smith", 113); 
        e.empID(); 
        e.empName(); 
    } 
 
} 
 
The intermediate code built by Java compiler 
using  Java  Development  Kit  (JDK),  1.5.0  
update  22  version,  for  each  method  is 
presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Java bytecode for Employee class 
Method header  Bytecode 
offset 
Operation 
code  
Bytecode instruction 
public 
Employee(java.lang.
String, int); 
0 
1 
 
4 
5 
6 
 
9 
10 
11 
 
14 
15 
16 
17 
 
20 
2A 
B7 00 01 
 
2A 
2B 
B5 00 02 
 
2A 
1C 
B5 00 03 
 
2A 
2B 
1C 
B6 00 04 
 
B1 
aload_0 
invokespecial   #1;  
//Method java/lang/Object."<init>":()V 
aload_0 
aload_1 
putfield #2;  
//Field Name:Ljava/lang/String; 
aload_0 
iload_2 
putfield #3;  
//Field id:I 
aload_0 
aload_1 
iload_2 
invokevirtual   #4; //Method 
procData:(Ljava/lang/String;I)V 
return 
public 
java.lang.String 
empName(); 
0 
1 
 
4 
2A 
B4 00 02 
 
B0 
aload_0 
getfield #2;  
//Field Name:Ljava/lang/String; 
areturn 
public int empID();  0 
1 
4 
2A 
B4 00 03 
AC 
aload_0 
getfield #3; //Field id:I 
ireturn 
public void 
procData(java.lang.
String, int); 
0 B1  return 
public static void 
main(java.lang.Stri
ng[]); 
0 
3 
4 
6 
BB 00 05 
59 
12 06 
10 71 
new #5; //class Employee 
dup 
ldc #6; //String Smith 
bipush  113 54    Informatica Economică vol. 17, no. 4/2013 
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8 
 
11 
12 
13 
16 
17 
18 
 
21 
22 
B7 00 07 
 
4C 
2B 
B6 00 08 
57 
2B 
B6 00 09 
 
57 
B1 
invokespecial   #7; //Method 
"<init>":(Ljava/lang/String;I)V 
astore_1 
aload_1 
invokevirtual #8; //Method empID:()I 
pop 
aload_1 
invokevirtual #9;  
//Method empName:()Ljava/lang/String; 
pop 
return 
 
JVM identifies the data structures where the 
operation  codes  of  the  intermediate 
instructions are stored in compiled Java file. 
JVM has a stack-based architecture used to 
translate  the  intermediate  instructions  to 
microcontroller  or  microprocessor  native 
code.  More  details regarding  the  .NET  and 
Java  virtual  machines  are  presented  in  [1], 
[2], [4], [5], [6], [8] and [9]. 
 
2  Binary  Code  Instrumentation  for 
Malicious Software Detection 
Code  instrumentation  is  a  technique  that 
inserts  code  to  analyze  and  modify  the 
behavior a program [3], [10]. Depending on 
code representation, the code instrumentation 
is done for: 
  Source code – text representation of the 
program; 
  Binary code  –  binary  encoded 
instructions of the program. 
Code instrumentation techniques are applied 
for the following analysis levels: 
  Static analysis –  t h e  p r o g r a m  
instrumentation  occurs  before  the 
program running; 
  Dynamic analysis  –  the  program 
behavior is analyzed by collecting run-
time information. 
Static binary code instrumentation. It  is 
method of analyzing the behavior of a binary 
application by modifying its object code or 
executable code before the program is run. 
Static  binary  code  instrumentation  needs 
advanced  knowledge  about  the  executable 
formats  like  EXE  and  PE.  The 
instrumentation  techniques  and  analysis  are 
more  expensive  than  the  dynamic 
instrumentation.  Two  important  and 
particular  issues  are  distinguished  during 
static instrumentation, according to [7]: 
  The  binary  application  is  statically 
disassembled; the disassembled code has 
not  accurate  information  about  the 
symbols  and  high  level  information 
regarding the symbols; 
  Instrumented  code  requires  more  space 
than  the  original  binary  code;  moving 
functions from the original binary code 
to  a  new  location  requires  relocation 
information  regarding  the  entry  points 
provided by the compiler. 
Static  binary  code  instrumentation  faces 
with the following challenges [7]: 
  Function boundaries and stack 
conventions –  i n  d i s a s s e m b l e d  c o d e ,  
functions may have multiple entry and/or 
exit  points;  the  function  exit  may  be 
caused  by  a  jump  instead  of  return 
instruction; using the stack may follow 
unusual  methods  for  Extended  Stack 
Pointer  (ESP)  and  Extended  Base 
Pointer (EBP) register handling in x86-
32bit  computer  architecture;  therefore, 
there is a lack of information replaced by 
assumption  information  during  the 
binary instrumentation; 
  Position-independent code –  t h e r e  a r e  
multiple  mechanisms  for  position  code 
relative  addressing;  static  binary 
instrumentation  involves  relocating  of 
function without relocating of static data; 
this issue needs fixing the position code 
relative  accesses  or  avoiding  relocation 
of the binary sequences that accesses the 
relative addresses; 
  Scalability and modularity –  c o d e  
instrumentation and analysis is done on 
modularity  principle  ensuring  the 
scalability of the binary instrumentation 
to large programs, keeping the accuracy 
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DOI: 10.12948/issn14531305/17.4.2013.05 
  Local variables  –  may  be  accessed  in 
different  ways:  using  ESP  as  base 
pointer,  using  computer  processor 
general register ECX by some functions 
like main in C language, using EBP to 
access  the  function  parameter  or  in 
general purpose; 
  Actual parameters – may be passed on 
the stack  or  via  registers;  they  may  be 
stored  at  stack-relative  addresses  or  in 
the top of the stack when the binary code 
is  optimized;  the  number  of  actual 
parameters are not established by a local 
examination of the function call; 
  Aliasing  –  multiple  pointer  expressions 
may  reference  the  same  memory, 
increasing  difficulty  to  identify  the 
instructions  that  accesses  that  memory 
location; pointer analysis is very difficult 
without  high-level  information  about 
variables, array sizes, types, and so forth; 
  Functions with side-effects –  s o m e  
operations  are  performed  by  function 
itself instead of its  caller, affecting the 
content  of  some  variables  and/or 
registers. 
Binary  instrumentation  is  a  well-known 
technique  used  in  computer  security  to 
analyze  binary  applications  in  exploit 
detection, sandboxing, malware analysis and 
so forth.  
Dynamic binary code instrumentation. It is a 
method of analyzing the behavior of a binary 
application  when  is  running.  The  analysis 
consists of code injection and examination of 
the effects on the binary code. 
The  benefits  of  the  dynamic  binary  code 
instrumentation are highlighted in [10]: 
  Recompiling or relinking is not needed; 
  Code discovered at run-time; 
  Generated code is handled dynamically; 
  It is attached to running code. 
A dynamic binary code instrumentation tool 
is Pin. Pin allows insertion of arbitrary code 
into executable when the program is running. 
Also,  Pin  can  be  attached  to  a  running 
program [10].  
Pin  works  like  a  “just  in  time”  (JIT) 
compiler.  Pin  generates  binary  code  that  is 
executed.  The  code  injection  is  done  into 
generated  binary  code,  the  only  code  ever 
executed.  Instrumentation  is  not  done  for 
instructions  that  are  ever  executed,  being 
placed into conditional branches avoided by 
the execution flow of the program. 
Dynamic  binary  code  instrumentation  done 
by Pin consists of two components [10]: 
  A  mechanism  to  establish  the  insertion 
points and what code to be inserted; 
  The  code  to  be  executed  at  insertion 
points. 
Pin  tool  implements  the  following 
instrumentation  techniques  for  analyzed 
executable files [10]: 
  Instruction instrumentation –  i n c l u d e s  
the below possible operations: 
-  Simple  instruction  counting  – 
instruments  a  binary  program  to 
count  the  number  of  instructions 
executed;  Pin  tool  inserts  a  call  to 
count  function  before  every 
instruction;  the  value  of  instruction 
count  is  saved  in  a  file  called 
inscount.out  when  the 
executable  file  finishes  its  running; 
the instruction count function is very 
simple, using a static integer variable 
and  is  passed  as  argument  to  a 
function  called  by  Pin  tools  before 
every instruction encountered in the 
executable file; functions are defined 
in inscount0.cpp from Pin tool 
[10];
 
static UINT64 icount = 0;
 
VOID docount() { icount++; }     
VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v){ 
INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount, IARG_END); 
} 
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The  INS_InsertCall  function 
inserts a call to docount function 
relative  to  instruction  ins. 
IPOINT_BEFORE is an enumerator 
always valid for all instructions and 
specifies  the  place  of  insertion. 
IARG_END  is  the  argument  list 
terminator  for  INS_InsertCall 
function. 
-  Instruction  address  tracing  – 
instruments  the  memory  addresses 
where  the  binary  instructions  are 
stored  during  execution  of  the 
program;  Pin  tool  inserts  a  call  to 
trace  function  before  every 
instruction in the executable file; the 
function  writes  the  content  of 
Instruction Pointer (IP) register into 
an output file  managed by a global 
variable  called  trace i n  
itrace.cpp source file defined in 
Pin tool [10]; 
 
FILE * trace; 
 
VOID printip(VOID *ip) {  
    fprintf(trace, "%p\n", ip);  
} 
VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v){ 
    INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)printip, IARG_INST_PTR, 
IARG_END); 
} 
 
The  printip  function  writes  the 
content  of  IP  register  into  the  file 
managed  by  trace  variable.  The 
I P  v a l u e  i s  r e c e i v e d  b y  ip 
parameter and it has to be passed to 
INS_InsertCall  function.  The 
argument  list  of 
INS_InsertCall  function  is 
changed  and  the  address  of  the 
instrumented  instruction  is  passed 
by  IARG_INST_PTR  enumerator. 
Pin  allows  passing  the  content  of 
different programming recipients by 
fields defined in the enumerator type 
called IARG_TYPE; 
-  Memory  reference  tracing  –    is  a 
selective  instrumentation  technique, 
aiming a set of instructions from the 
binary  code  instrumented;  for 
example, only instructions that read 
or write memory are considered; Pin 
tools  inserts  analysis  function  calls 
when  each  time  when  a  memory 
operand  is  encountered  during  the 
execution  flow  of  the  binary 
program;  the  source  code  of  this 
dynamic instrumentation technique is 
given  in  pinatrace.cpp  source 
program  and  the  results  are  saved 
into  pinatrace.out f i l e  b y  t h e  
Pin tool [10]; 
 
FILE * trace; 
 
VOID RecordMemRead(VOID * ip, VOID * addr){ 
    fprintf(trace,"%p: R %p\n", ip, addr); 
} 
VOID RecordMemWrite(VOID * ip, VOID * addr){ 
    fprintf(trace,"%p: W %p\n", ip, addr); 
} 
VOID Instruction(INS ins, VOID *v) 
{ 
    UINT32 memOperands = INS_MemoryOperandCount(ins); 
     
    for (UINT32 memOp = 0; memOp < memOperands; memOp++) 
    { 
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        { 
            INS_InsertPredicatedCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, 
(AFUNPTR)RecordMemRead, IARG_INST_PTR, IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, 
memOp, IARG_END); 
        }         
        if (INS_MemoryOperandIsWritten(ins, memOp)) 
        { 
            INS_InsertPredicatedCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, 
(AFUNPTR)RecordMemWrite, IARG_INST_PTR, IARG_MEMORYOP_EA, 
memOp, IARG_END); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
The  RecordMemRead  function 
prints a read memory record to the 
output  file.  The 
RecordMemWrite function prints 
a write memory record to the output 
file.  There  is  a  single  output  file 
called  pinatrace.out.  The 
memory record has the layout: 
 
(IP, memOpType, memAddr) 
 
where: 
o  IP – Instruction Pointer register, 
containing  the  address  of  the 
instruction; 
o  memOpType –  t y p e  o f  t h e  
memory operation; it takes R or 
W as values; 
o  memAddr – the memory address 
of the operand; 
The  Instruction  function  is 
called  for  each  instruction, 
instrumenting the memory read and 
write  operations.  The  number  of 
memory  operands  is  returned  by 
INS_MemoryOperandCount 
function  for  each  instruction  ins. 
The  memory  operation  type  is 
checked  by 
INS_MemoryOperandIsRead 
and 
INS_MemoryOperandIsWritt
en  functions,  requiring  the  ins 
instruction  and  memOp  operand 
index.  The 
INS_InsertPredicatedCall 
function  avoids  the  predicated 
instructions  with  false  predicate. 
The  function  call  passes  the 
instruction,  the  call  place,  the 
address  of  RecordMemRead o r  
RecordMemWrite  function,  the 
instruction  address,  the  effective 
address of the memory operand by 
IARG_MEMORYOP_EA enumerator, 
the operand index of the instruction, 
and the argument list terminator. 
  Image instrumentation –  a i m s  l o a d i n g  
and  unloading  of  images.  A  trace  file 
called imageload.out is created and 
contains trace messages related to loaded 
or  unloading  images.  The  source 
program  containing  the  application  for 
image  instrumentation  technique  is 
imageload.cpp  [10].  The  needed 
functions  are  described  below.
 
ofstream TraceFile; 
 
VOID ImageLoad(IMG img, VOID *v){ 
    TraceFile << "Loading " << IMG_Name(img) << ", Image id = " << 
IMG_Id(img) << endl; 
} 
 
VOID ImageUnload(IMG img, VOID *v){ 
    TraceFile << "Unloading " << IMG_Name(img) << endl; 
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IMG_AddInstrumentFunction(ImageLoad, 0);
IMG_AddUnloadFunction(ImageUnload, 0); 
 
The ImageLoad function is called by 
Pin  tool  every  time  when  an  image  is 
loaded.  Also,  the  image  can  be 
instrumented. An image is a binary code 
sequence  stored  separately  as  the 
instrumented  binary  code.  The 
ImageUnload function is called when 
a new image is unloaded. An image that 
is  about  to  be  unloaded  cannot  be 
instrumented.  The 
IMG_AddInstrumentFunction 
function  is  called  to  register  the 
ImageLoad  callback  to  catch  the 
loaded  image.  The 
IMG_AddUnloadFunction f u n c t i o n  
call passes the image that is about to be 
unloaded  and  the  value  of 
ImageUnload function. The unloaded 
images  cannot  be  instrumented,  so  the 
ImageUnload  is  not  an 
instrumentation function. 
  Trace instrumentation –  i s  a  m o r e  
efficient  instruction  counting.  The 
c o u n t e r  i s  i n c r e m e n t e d  p e r  b a s i c  b l o c k  
instead of each instruction. In [10], trace 
instrumentation  is  implemented  in 
inscount1.cpp application.  
 
static UINT64 icount = 0;
 
VOID docount(UINT32 c) {  
    icount += c;  
}    
VOID Trace(TRACE trace, VOID *v){ 
    for (BBL bbl = TRACE_BblHead(trace); BBL_Valid(bbl);  
bbl = BBL_Next(bbl)) { 
        BBL_InsertCall(bbl, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount,  
IARG_UINT32, BBL_NumIns(bbl), IARG_END); 
    } 
} 
 
The docount function is called before 
every  basic  block.  The  trace 
parameter  is  an  object  assigned  to  a 
sequence  of  instructions  with  a  single 
entrance  and  multiple  exits.  The  for 
instruction parses the basic block set of 
the binary application and inserts a call 
to docount function before every basic 
block by BBL_InsertCall function. 
The  BBL_InsertCall  function  call 
passes  the  basic  block  to  be 
instrumented,  the  call  place,  the 
instrumentation  function,  the  argument 
of  docount  function,  number  of 
instructions within the bbl basic block 
and argument list terminator. 
  Routine instrumentation –  i s  m a d e  i n  
[10]  by  number  of  calls  for  each 
procedures  and  the  number  of 
instructions executed in each procedure. 
The instrumentation report is printed to 
proccount.out f i l e ,  a n d  t h e  s o u r c e  
file  of  the  application  is 
proccount.cpp.
 
ofstream outFile; 
 
typedef struct RtnCount { 
    string _name; 
    string _image; 
    ADDRINT _address; 
    RTN _rtn; 
    UINT64 _rtnCount; 
    UINT64 _icount; 
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} RTN_COUNT; 
 
RTN_COUNT * RtnList = 0; 
 
VOID docount(UINT64 * counter) { 
    (*counter)++; 
} 
     
const char * StripPath(const char * path) { 
    const char * file = strrchr(path,'/'); 
    if (file) 
        return file+1; 
    else 
        return path; 
} 
 
VOID Routine(RTN rtn, VOID *v) {     
    RTN_COUNT * rc = new RTN_COUNT; 
 
    rc->_name = RTN_Name(rtn); 
    rc->_image = StripPath(IMG_Name(SEC_Img(RTN_Sec(rtn))).c_str()); 
    rc->_address = RTN_Address(rtn); 
    rc->_icount = 0; 
    rc->_rtnCount = 0; 
    rc->_next = RtnList; 
    RtnList = rc;             
    RTN_Open(rtn); 
             
    RTN_InsertCall(rtn, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount, IARG_PTR,  
&(rc->_rtnCount), IARG_END); 
     
    for (INS ins = RTN_InsHead(rtn); INS_Valid(ins); ins = INS_Next(ins)){
        INS_InsertCall(ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR)docount,  
IARG_PTR, &(rc->_icount), IARG_END); 
    }     
    RTN_Close(rtn); 
} 
 
The Routine function is called every 
time  when  a  new  routine  is  executed. 
The rc local variable is a simple linked 
list to store information related to current 
routine.  The  current  running  routine  is 
added to global list of routine managed 
by  RtnList  global  variable.  The  call 
count  of  the  current  routine  is 
incremented  by  RTN_InsertCall 
function call. The instruction counter for 
each routine is also stored by the simple 
linked  list.  The  incrementing  of 
instruction  counter  is  made  by 
INS_InsertCall  function  call.  The 
routines are managed by routine objects 
and a certain routine is instrumented by 
referring the object name.  
Binary  code  instrumentation  provides 
information about the binary applications and 
helps to improve the correctness and speed of 
the developed programs. Also, the program 
behavior  checking  provides  valuable 
information  about  third-party  application, 
identifying  the  suspicious  behaviors  of  the 
programs from unsecure sources. 
 
3 Methods and Techniques of Binary Code 
Injection 
Binary  code  injection  inserts  a  binary 
sequence into a binary computer program to 
change the intended course of execution.  
A way to change the course of execution in 
native  executable  files  is  altering  of  IP 
register. IP is a special-purpose register that 
stores  the  memory  address  of  the  next 
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programmatically accessed and its content is 
altered  by  instructions  such  as  jmp,  call 
and  ret.  These  instructions  permit  the 
access to old IP values automatically pushed 
onto stack.  
The  stack  content  for  x86-16bit  computer 
architecture  when  a  function  is  called  is 
depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Accessing stack content in a far 
function  
The above stack content is available after a 
far  function  call  with  two  arguments.  All 
local variables are allocated on stack at lower 
memory addresses, and the return address to 
caller has the offsets from the current BP as 2 
bytes for IP register restore and 4 bytes for 
CS register restore.  
The  IP  content  is  restored  when  the  ret 
instruction  is  executed.  All  these  issues 
together  with  a  stack  content  management 
may  cause  the  change  the  course  of 
execution. 
To get the current value of the IP register, a 
dummy  function  is  defined  and  its  call  is 
followed by extracting the value from the top 
of  the  stack.  Therefore,  the  stack  portion 
where  the  return  address  is  stored  may  be 
overwritten by the extracted value of IP, and 
the program execution is altered.  
For  x86-16bit  computer  architecture,  the 
register  size  is  16  bits.  Also,  the  computer 
word  has  16  bits  length.  For  x86-32bit 
computer  architecture,  the  register  size  and 
computer word are extended to 32 bits. The 
IP, BP and SP registers are included in the 
extended versions called EIP, EBP and ESP 
registers. 
An  example  for  IP  content  handling  is 
presented  below.  The  binary  code  of  the 
sequence is injected into the binary code of 
the  Employee  constructor  method 
presented in chapter 1. 
 
Table 6. Native code injection 
Method header  Memory 
address 
Binary assembly 
instruction 
Assembly instruction 
Employee(char*,int); ;previous 
addresses 
 
00FF146B 
00FF146E 
00FF1471 
 
 
 
00FF1474 
00FF1479 
00FF147A 
 
 
00FF147D 
00FF1480 
00FF1481 
00FF1484 
00FF14A3 
;previous binary 
instructions 
 
8B 45 F8 
8B 4D 0C 
89 48 04 
 
;injected binary 
instructions 
E8 00 00 00 00 
59 
89 4D 08 
;old binary 
sequence 
8B 45 0C 
50 
8B 4D 08 
51 
C2 08 00 
;previou asm instructions 
 
 
mov eax,dword ptr [this]   
mov ecx,dword ptr [nr]   
mov dword ptr [eax+4],ecx 
  
;injected asm instructions 
 
call dummy (0FF1479h) 
pop ecx 
mov dword ptr [aName],ecx    
;old asm sequence 
 
mov eax,dword ptr [nr]   
push eax   
mov ecx,dword ptr [aName]   
push ecx   
ret 8   
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The effect of the injected Employee code in 
constructor method is a wrong aName string 
parameter passed to procData method. The 
IP  content  popped  by  ECX  register  is  the 
address  of  the  pop ecx  instruction.  A 
disastrous  effect  is  produced  when  the 
restored IP register contains a malicious code 
address. 
Also,  elaborated  stack  buffer  overflow 
attacks can be carried out by redirecting the 
execution  flow  to  the  shellcode  that 
overwrites the vulnerable buffer of the target 
host.  
The bytecode injection consists in changing 
the  existing  bytecode  to  redirect  the 
execution flow built by virtual machine. For 
Java  programming  language,  that  means 
modification of the compiled file stored by 
the  class  file  and  interpreted  by  the  Java 
Virtual Machine. That issue is available for 
programs  with  malicious  intent.  However, 
there  are  situations  when  code  injection 
techniques  are  used  for  bytecode 
instrumentation  of  the  third-party  libraries 
which the source code is not available or a 
debugger or a profiler cannot be used. Also, 
the bytecode injection is used in performance 
monitoring of the application [12]. 
The  bytecode  injection  allows  modification 
of  third-party  bytecode  without  the  source 
code availability. The injection  is  asked by 
existence of some bugs or limitations of the 
third-party  software  to  see  the  behavior 
change  and  possible  solutions  to  pass  over 
the  software  problems.  The  following 
considerations are taken into account by [12] 
as  good  reasons  to  apply  injection 
techniques: 
  The  exception  generated  by  a  method 
during a data set processing provides no 
information about what data element has 
caused it; 
  Collecting performance statistics; 
  The  failure  of  a  data  batch  processing 
when a data set is send to a database by 
Java Database Connectivity (JDBC). 
Advantages  of  Java  bytecode  injection  are 
presented in [12]: 
  Modification  of  the  binary  code  when 
the source code is not available; 
  Collecting  run-time  information  when 
tools like debuggers and profilers cannot 
be used; 
  Modularity of the injected bytecode; 
  Keeping the original bytecode by using 
tools for bytecode injection; 
  Doing  injection  at  compile-time  when 
the  bytecode  is  built  or  run-time  when 
the target classes are loaded by the JVM. 
The Java bytecode format is presented in [1], 
[2], [4], [5], [6], [8] and [9]. Depending on 
level  of  abstraction,  the  injection  tools  aim 
[12]: 
  Direct  bytecode  manipulation  (ASM 
tool)–  Java  bytecode  understanding  is 
needed because the level of abstraction 
is very low; the developer has to work 
with operation codes, the operand stack 
and bytecode instructions; 
  Intermediate level (Javassist tool) – the 
code  is  given  in  strings,  the  classfile 
structure has a level of abstraction; 
  A d v i c e s  i n  J a v a  ( A s p e c t J  t o o l )  –  t h e  
code to be injected has a syntax-checked 
format and it is compiled. 
The  injection  techniques  are  classified  by 
[12] into the following categories: 
  Manual injection – the developer knows 
the place where the code is injected; to 
do  that,  the  developer  must  know  the 
classfile format; 
  Primitive pointcuts  –  pointcut  is  an 
expression  telling  the  place  where  a 
particular bytecode must be injected; this 
injection techniques has limitation about 
the place: a particular method, all public 
methods of a class and so forth; 
  Pattern matching pointcut expressions – 
match  the  target  bytecode  based  on  a 
number of criteria. 
The bytecode injection time may be [12]: 
  Manually at run-time –  t h e  b y t e c o d e  
asks for injected bytecode; 
  Load-time  –  bytecode  injection  is 
performed  when  the  target  bytecode  is 
loaded by the JVM; 
  Build-time – the bytecode is modified by 
injection  before  packaging  and 
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According to [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [8] and [9] 
where  the  Java  classfile  structure  is 
explained,  injection  of  a  new  method  into 
classfile  involves  the  structure  information 
modifications inside the classfile in addition 
to  the  method  bytecode.  Modifications  are 
manually  done  in  the  classfile  or 
implemented  in  libraries  as  injection  tool. 
The  operations  needed  to  keep  a  viable 
classfile  to  be  correctly  interpreted  by  the 
JVM are: 
  Addition of the method in the Constant 
Pool  –  write  the  information  as  a 
constant pool entry: 
-  Adding  UTF8  method  name  to 
constant pool; 
-  Adding  UTF8  descriptor  index  to 
constant pool; 
-  Adding  method  name  type  to 
constant pool; 
-  Adding  method  type  to  constant 
pool; 
  Injection  of  the  method  bytecode  – 
inserting the method binary code into the 
classfile: 
-  Insertion of the method bytecode; 
-  Write the bytecode image; 
-  Adjusting  the  offsets:  code  length, 
maximum  stack,  exception  table, 
code attributes, and attribute length. 
The new content of the classfile has to meet 
the  structural  constraints  to  pass  the 
verification  proceeded  by  JVM  in  order  to 
interpret the bytecode correctly. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Binary code instrumentation offers the tools 
needed to increase the security and reliability 
of  a  software  application.  Therefore,  the 
developers  are  able  to  understand  how  an 
exploit  is  created  to  pass  the  security 
mechanisms  of  the  application  in  order  to 
build defense techniques. 
Also, the binary code instrumentation may be 
used  reverse  engineering  of  malwares  in 
order  to  detect  them  and  implement 
protection techniques.  
The system security depends on the safety of 
running binary code, operating system kernel 
internals, linker and loader internals that have 
to  be  known  and  understood  by  software 
developers. 
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